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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOHN W. JARMAN and HELENE B. 
JARMAN, 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, 
vs . 
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING 
COMPANY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Docket No. 890106-CA 
Priority No. 14b 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This Court has jurisdiction over this action by virtue 
of the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-3(j). This is an 
appeal from a final judgment of the Third District Court 
ordering defendant to remove its billboards from plaintiffs' 
property and from an order denying defendants' Motion to Amend 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
There are only three issues presented to this Court 
for review: 
1. Was the District Court correct in its determina-
tion that the Reagan lease was ambiguous? 
2. Was the District Court's judgment that the facts 
presented at trial preponderated in favor of the plaintiffs 
clearly erroneous? 
3. Are the District Court's Findings of Fact 
supported by the evidence presented at trial? 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which reads as 
follows: 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effectc In all actions tried upon 
the facts without a jury or with an advisory 
jury, the court shall find the facts 
specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment 
shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in 
granting or refusing interlocutory 
injunctions the court shall similarly set 
forth the findings of fact and conclusions 
of law which constitute the grounds of its 
action. Requests for findings are not 
necessary for purposes of review. Findings 
of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the 
trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses. The findings of a master, to the 
extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
considered as the findings of the court. It 
will be sufficient if the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law are stated orally and 
recorded in open court following the close 
of the evidence or appear in an opinion or 
memorandum of decision filed by the court. 
The trial court need not enter findings of 
fact and conclusions of law in rulings on 
motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). 
The court shall, however, issue a brief 
written statement on the ground for its 
decision on all motions granted under Rules 
12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the 
motion is based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party 
made not later than 10 days after entry of 
judgment the court may amend its findings or 
make additional findings and may amend the 
judgment accordingly. The motion may be 
made with a motion for a new trial pursuant 
to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made 
in actions tried by the court without a 
jury, the question of the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support the findings may 
thereafter be raised whether or not the 
party raising the question has made either a 
motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, 
or a motion for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action in trespass wherein the plaintiffs 
alleged that certain billboards were relocated by defendant to 
an area not contemplated in their lease agreement. The matter 
was presented to the trial court and tried without a jury. The 
court entered judgment for the plaintiffs on October 18, 1988. 
John W. Jarman and Helene B. Jarman purchased the 
subject property in 1980. (R. 209, p. 10) The property is 
located adjacent to State Highway 224 near Kimball Junction in 
Summit County, Utah. (R. 209, p. 8) At the time the Jarmans 
purchased the property, two advertising signs were already 
located on the property. (R. 209, p. 10) 
Eventually, Mr. Jarman contacted Galaxy Outdoor 
Advertising, Reagan's predecessor in interest, to inquire about 
ownership of the signs. (R. 209, p. 10; R. 47) Sometime in 
early 1982, Mr. Jarman entered into discussions with Terry 
Reid, Reagan's representative, in an attempt to reach an 
agreement regarding the signs. (R. 209, p. 11) 
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Galaxy had originally erected the signs in 1971 
pursuant to two leases entered into between Galaxy and the 
owner of the property at that time, one Swindle. (R. 44 and 
45) The description incorporated into the 1971 lease to define 
the location of the signs was the same description used in the 
1982 lease between Jarman and Reagan. (R. 209, p. 30). 
At the time Mr. Jarman entered into the lease 
agreement with Reagan, he believed that the property 
description contained in that agreement limited the signs to 
the locations they occupied at that time. (R. 209, pp. 12, 28, 
29) Reagan admitted that once the billboards were in place, 
their locations were defined. (R. 209, pp. 47, 48) It was 
never Mr. Jarman's intention to permit Reagan the option of 
moving the signs. (R. 209, pp. 28, 29) Reagan never 
communicated to Mr. Jarman that it believed it could use 
portions of Mr. Jarman's property other than those upon which 
the signs were originally situated. (R. 209, p. 13). 
In 1987, pursuant to the widening of State Highway 224 
adjacent to the Jarman property, the State of Utah acquired a 
strip of the Jarmans' property approximately 10 to 30 feet 
wide. (R. 209, p. 16) The State's right-of-way took a portion 
of the property upon which the signs were located. (R. 209, 
pp. 41, 42) The State informed Reagan that it would have to 
remove the signs from the right-of-way. (R. 209, p. 39) 
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Instead of removing the signs, Reagan, without 
negotiation with Mr. Jarman or notice, moved the signs to a 
portion of the Jarmans' property not contemplated by the lease 
agreement. (R. 209, pp. 28, 19) Mr. Jarman did not give 
Reagan his consent to relocate the signs. (R. 209, p. 19) 
The Jarmans filed their Complaint against Reagan 
seeking redress for Reagan's trespass on December 10, 1987. 
Prior to trial on the merits, Reagan brought a motion for 
summary judgment which the trial court denied. Trial was held 
before the Honorable Michael R. Murphy on September 9, 1988. 
Both parties were represented by counsel and presented evidence 
in the form of testimony and documentary evidence. 
The trial court determined that the critical terms of 
the lease were ambiguous and, based on the extrinsic evidence 
presented by the parties at trial, entered judgment in favor of 
the Jarmans and ordered that the billboard structures be 
removed. The Court entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. Reagan moved to amend the Court's Findings 
and Conclusions. A hearing was held November 21, 1988 on 
Reagan's Motion. The motion was denied. (R. 209, pp. 102-106) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The 1982 lease agreement is ambiguous. The 
description of the leasehold, drafted by Reagan, can only be 
understood through the examination of extrinsic evidence. 
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The trial court examined extrinsic evidence, presented 
by both parties, and determined that the leasehold was limited 
to the specific location occupied by Reagan's billboards at the 
time the 1982 Lease was executed. The evidence presented was 
more than sufficient to allow the Court to reach that 
conclusion. No error was committed by the trial court. 
The trial court's findings of fact were sufficiently 
based upon the evidence presented at trial. Reagan has failed 
to meet its burden in showing that the trial judge committed 
clear error. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE REAGAN 
LEASE IS AMBIGUOUS 
The lease entered into by the Jarmans and Reagan was 
drafted by Reagan. The description of the leasehold, contained 
therein, was also drafted by Reagan. (R. 209, pp. 18, 30) The 
leasehold description states: 
. . . in the County of Summit, State of Utah 
and more particularly described as follows: 
State Hwy. 224 across from State Hwy. sheds 
s/o Kimball Jet. & State Hwy. 224 300' s/o 
State Hwy. shed, s/o Kimball Jet. 
Because the signs were already in place when the Jarmans 
purchased the property (R. 209, p. 10) and because, during 
negotiation of the lease, Reagan did not indicate that it 
believed the leasehold included property not already occupied 
by the signs (R. 209, p. 13), the Jarmans reasonably understood 
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the leasehold description to include only that portion of the 
property actually occupied by the signs (R. 209, p. 12) 
Reagan, on the other hand, has contended that the 
lease allowed it to utilize any other portion of the Jarmans' 
property in the event the portion occupied by the signs should 
be sold or developed. Reagan relies for this contention upon a 
clause in the lease which purports to define the specific 
events under which the lessor may terminate the lease. That 
clause reads: 
Lessor shall have the right to terminate 
this lease at any time during the term of 
this lease if: (a) Lessor builds or 
develops the property where the sign(s) 
structure(s) is situated; or (b) in the 
event Lessor sells the premises, the buyer 
of said premise has the right to terminate 
this lease within thirty (30) days 
immediately following recordation of deed of 
sale, if buyer gives lessee written notice 
of termination. Lessee will remove its 
sign(s) within thirty (30) days after 
receiving a written copy of the deed or 
valid building permit together with prepaid 
unearned rent. If any portion of the 
property is not utilized for such buildings, 
Lessee has the option to use the remaining 
portion on the same terms. 
That language is ambiguous. It states that the "[l]essor shall 
have the right to terminate [the] lease . . . if:" and follows 
up the "if:" with part M(a)M and part M(b).M Part M(a)M 
arguably provides that the lessor may terminate the lease in 
the event the lessor develops the property where the billboards 
are located. Part M(b)M arguably provides that the eventual 
purchaser of the property may terminate the lease upon thirty 
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(30) days written notice within thirty (30) days after 
recordation of the deed of sale. It was Reagan's position at 
trial, and continues to be Reagan's position that what parts 
"(a)" and "(b)" give, the last sentence of the clause, 
apparently included under part "(b)," takes away. That 
sentence uses the term, "such buildings" but part "(b)" 
addresses sale of the land, not development. Even the portion 
of part "(b)" which appears to rather clearly grant a 
purchaser of the property a right to terminate is apparently 
not clear; at least not to Reagan. At trial, Reagan's vice 
president, Terry Reid, testified that part "(b)" only "gives 
the lessor a right to grant to a purchaser the right to 
terminate. (R. 209, p. 62). Reagan's lease is so written that 
it is subject to numerous contradicting interpretations. 
Without examination of extrinsic evidence the meaning of the 
Reagan lease, like beauty, is in the eyes of the beholder. 
Language is considered ambiguous if the 
words used to express the meaning and 
intention of the parties are insufficient in 
a sense that the contract may be understood 
to reach two or more plausible meanings. 
American Bonding Co. v. Nelson, 763 P.2d 814, 816 (Utah App. 
1988) . 
Contrary to Reagan's conclusion, two or more meanings 
are plausible from the language of the lease. The leasehold 
description provides that one sign would be located "300' s/o 
State Hwy. shed. ..." The 300' distance was only an 
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approximation; the actual distance never having been measured. 
(R. 209, p. 39) Mr. Jarman, applying the same method of 
approximation, judged that distance to be 1,000 feet or more. 
(R. 209, p. 16) 
Reagan never obtained a metes and bounds measurement 
to more closely define its leasehold nor did it ask Mr. Jarman 
to provide one. (R. 209, pp. 37, 16) Without the actual 
physical presence of the signs to define the extent of the 
leasehold, the leasehold description is simply too ambiguous to 
define Reagan's rights in the Jarmans' property without 
examining extrinsic evidence. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT WAS BASED ON A PROPER AND 
ACCURATE ASSESSMENT OF THE FACTS PRESENTED AT TRIAL. 
The Reagan lease agreement is ambiguous. This Court 
has stated that: 
. . . when a contract is ambiguous because 
of uncertainty or incompleteness concerning 
the parties' rights and duties under the 
contract, extrinsic evidence is permissible 
to ascertain the parties' intent. 
Power Sys. & Controls v. K e i t h ' s E l e c , 765 P.2d 5, 9 (Utah 
App. 1988). The trial court examined the extrinsic evidence 
presented by both parties and, weighing that evidence, entered 
judgment in the Jarmans' favor. This Court has articulated a 
standard granting significant deference to the trial court's 
factual assessment. 
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On appeal of a judgment from the bench after 
trial, we defer to the trial court's factual 
assessment unless there is clear error. 
Copper State Leasing v. Blacker Appliance & Furniture, 770 P.2d 
88, (Utah App. 1988) . 
The trial court's determination was supported by the 
facts presented by both parties. In its brief, Reagan argues 
that the extrinsic evidence presented at trial was "more than 
sufficient to establish that Reagan had the right to relocate 
its structures. ..." This assertion, even if true, is 
irrelevant. The question is not whether the court could have 
found for Reagan had it credited Reagan's evidence, but rather 
whether there was an evidentiary basis for finding for the 
Jarmans. 
Even when Reagan attempts to marshal1 the evidence 
which could have supported a judgment in its favor, it points 
to facts which actually support the judgment as entered. For 
example, the second "fact" upon which Reagan relies is that "no 
exact description for the location of the Reagan structures was 
affixed to the 1971 leases and no attempt to fix their exact 
locations was made at the time the 1982 lease was executed." 
(Appellant's brief at p.14). This statement is as much as an 
admission by Reagan that the agreement's leasehold description 
is ambiguous and does not adequately define the exact location 
of the billboards. It also ignores testimony by Reagan's own 
agent that the property description was written into the 1971 
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leases before the signs were erected and that the eventual 
erection of the signs then defined their precise location. (R. 
209, pp. 47, 48). 
Reagan also states that Mr. Jarman admitted that the 
leasehold description contained in the 1982 lease agreement 
still describes the present location of the signs. Reagan 
makes this assertion twice in its brief, neither time citing to 
the record or any other authority. However, Mr. Jarman's 
testimony, which apparently was believed by the trial court, 
was just the opposite. (R. 209, pp. 26, 27). 
Reagan's other contentions do not support reversal of 
the judgment. The assertion that it was Mr. Jarman*s intention 
to allow Reagan to maintain two billboards on his property, 
while true, adds no weight to Reagan's argument. The two signs 
which Mr. Jarman intended to allow Reagan to maintain were the 
two signs already in place when the 1982 agreement was entered 
into. (R. 209, p. 12). He intended that they would remain 
precisely where they were. (R. 209, pp. 12, 28, 29). 
The fact that the state paid Reagan to "relocate, not 
remove," the structures is irrelevant. The state was not a 
party to the lease agreement nor could the state authorize 
Reagan's trespass to the Jarmans' property. 
Reagan suggests that it "never understood that it was 
strictly limited with regard to the location of its signs." 
Reagan presented testimony to that effect which was properly 
considered and weighed by the court. 
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Finally, Reagan argues that only a portion of each 
sign was relocated. The trial court correctly ruled that the 
relocation, to the extent it took place, constituted a 
trespass. The defendant presents no authority for the • 
proposition that this ruling is erroneous. In short, instead 
of detailing why the Court's findings were not supported by the 
evidence, as is the appellant's burden, Reagan simply reargues 
his case and requests that this Court substitute its judgment 
for that of the trial court. That is not the function of an 
appellate court. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE SUPPORTED BY 
THE EVIDENCE AND SUPPORT ITS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ITS JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE JARMANS. 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides in pertinent part that: 
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the 
trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses. 
The Reagan contract is ambiguous. The trial court found facts 
regarding the parties' intentions from evidence extrinsic to 
the contract itself. "Those findings may not be set aside on 
appeal unless they are clearly erroneous under Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 52(a)." Crowther v. Carter, 767 P.2d 129, 131 
(Utah App. 1989) . 
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The trial court's findings are supported by competent 
and sufficient evidence and conform to that evidence. Under 
these circumstances, the appellate court must regard those 
findings as sufficient. Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998 (Utah 
App. 1989). 
Reagan argues that the trial court should have amended 
its findings because Reagan, in its motion, pointed to evidence 
which was contrary to the court's findings. Reagan, in 
essence, argues that the trial court should have amended its 
findings, not because they lacked evidentiary support, but 
merely because Reagan had presented certain conflicting 
evidence which the court had not addressed in its findings. 
A trial court need not resolve every 
conflicting evidentiary issue, M[n]or is the 
court required to negate allegations in its 
findings of fact." 
Sampson, supra at 56, quoting Sorenson v. Beers, 614 P.2d 159, 
160 (Utah 1980) . 
In bringing its Motion to Amend before the trial court 
and its appeal before this Court, Reagan simply has not met its 
burden in attacking the trial court's findings. Reagan must do 
much more than simply show the existence of conflicting 
evidence. In General Glass Corp. v. Mast Const. Co., 766 P.2d 
429 (Utah App. 1988), a case cited in Reagan's brief, this 
Court repeated what it has "said on numerous occasions;" that: 
in order to challenge a finding of fact, it 
is appellant's burden to marshall all the 
evidence that supports the court's finding 
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and then demonstrate why even viewing it in 
the light most favorable to the court below, 
it is insufficient to support the finding 
made. 
Id. at 433. Reagan has fallen far short of meeting this 
burden. It addresses virtually none of the evidence supporting 
the trial court's findings. It would, in fact, have this Court 
believe that the only evidence in opposition to the "facts" 
supporting Reagan's position is "the mere statement by Mr. 
Jarman that he 'intended' the lease to be limited to sign 
locations of 1982. ..." (Reagan's Brief, p. 15). Reagan's 
insinuation is that Mr. Jarman's testimony was untrustworthy. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) recognizes the trial court's 
superior opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
Reagan specifically challenges the trial court's 
findings of fact numbers 2, 3, 4, 5 and 8. Evidence was 
presented at trial to support each of those findings. 
The trial court found that the lease describes two 
specific locations upon which Reagan was authorized to locate 
two billboards. The court had sufficient evidence upon which 
to base that finding. It is, first of all, uncontroverted that 
the billboards were already in place when the Jarmans purchased 
the property and later entered into the lease agreement with 
Reagan. (R. 209, p. 10, 14, 39, 48, 52). At the time the 
lease was negotiated there was no discussion concerning the 
extent of the leasehold. (R. 209, p.12). Mr. Jarman did not 
feel there was a need to discuss the extent of the leasehold 
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which he felt was defined by the actual placement of the 
billboards. (R. 209, p.12). Mr. Richard Paxman, Jarmans' 
representative, testified that once the billboards were 
erected, their locations were defined. (R. 209, p.47, 48). 
The trial court also found that the 1971 leases 
between Galaxy and Swindle each authorized the placement of one 
billboard on a specific site — "the site occupied by the 
billboards at the time the lease between the plaintiffs and 
defendant was signed." The testimony discussed above, and 
particularly Mr. Paxman's testimony, supports this finding. 
The trial court provides its own evidentiary support 
for its next finding, which states: 
Based upon the property description in the 
February 1982 Lease, the fact that the 
billboards were in place at the time the 
Lease was signed, and based upon the 
testimony of Mr. Jarman that he intended to 
lease defendant only the property upon which 
the billboards were situated, the Court 
finds that the parties intended the Lease to 
continue the right of defendant to maintain 
the billboards in their existing locations. 
Reagan also challenges the trial court's finding that 
the 1982 Lease is ambiguous and subject to the introduction and 
consideration of parol evidence to aid in its interpretation. 
The correctness of this finding is discussed in part I of 
respondents' argument, above. 
The only other finding challenged by Reagan in this 
appeal is the court's finding that: 
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Defendant removed the billboards from the 
locations they occupied upon the execution 
of the 1982 Lease then moved them to other 
locations on plaintiff's property without 
the knowledge or consent of the plaintiffs. 
Reagan implies in its brief that the court believed Reagan 
moved the billboards to a significantly different portion of 
the Jarmans' 103 acre property and that the signs were moved in 
their entirety. That clearly was not the trial court's 
understanding. The court heard Mr. Paxman's testimony of 
exactly how the billboards were relocated and that one beam of 
each remained in place on Reagan's leasehold. (R. 209, pp. 
41-44). The one critical fact remains; that Reagan, without 
notice to the Jarmans or their consent (R. 209, pp. 19, 32), 
moved the billboards onto a portion of the Jarmans' property 
not contemplated under the terms of the agreement reached by 
the parties. That action constituted a trespass as much as if 
Reagan had moved each billboard a mile. 
Each of the trial court's findings are supported by 
the evidence and judgment entered below should be affirmed by 
this court. 
CONCLUSION 
If Reagan's appeal of the trial court's judgment has 
merit, it has failed to show where that merit lies. Instead of 
addressing the evidence relied upon by the trial court in 
reaching its decision, and demonstrating why that evidence was 
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insufficient to support the trial court's findings, Reagan has 
simply reargued to this Court the case which it argued below. 
As much as Reagan might desire to have its appeal proceed as a 
trial de novo, it is this Court's duty only to determine 
whether the trial court's judgment was clearly erroneous. 
Reagan has failed to show that the trial court committed any 
error. The Jarmans have, on the other hand, shown that each of 
the trial court's findings which are disputed by Reagan are 
supported by the evidence. This Court should, therefore, rule 
in favor of the respondents by affirming the trial court's 
findings and judgment. 
DATED this day of June, 1989. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
By J/crr\ 
Don R. Schow 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/ 
Respondents 
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